Container Escape Prevention — Du deployst Container ohne Hardening. Privilegierter Container, Angreifer hat Root auf Host. Lateral Movement, dein Cluster ist kompromittiert.

# WRONG — never run in production
docker run --privileged myimage

# CORRECT — drop ALL capabilities, add only what's needed
docker run --cap-drop=ALL --cap-add=NET_BIND_SERVICE myimage

# Kubernetes: enforce via Pod Security Standards
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
spec:
  securityContext:
    runAsNonRoot: true
    seccompProfile:
      type: RuntimeDefault
  containers:
  - name: app
    securityContext:
      allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
      privileged: false
      capabilities:
        drop: ["ALL"]
        add: ["NET_BIND_SERVICE"]  # only if needed

# WRONG — mounts giving host escape
docker run -v /:/host myimage          # Full host filesystem
docker run -v /etc:/etc myimage        # Host config
docker run -v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock myimage  # Docker-in-Docker escape

# CORRECT — mount only what's needed, read-only where possible
docker run -v /data/app:/app:ro myimage

# Kubernetes: OPA Gatekeeper policy blocking docker.sock mounts
apiVersion: constraints.gatekeeper.sh/v1beta1
kind: K8sPSPVolumeTypes
metadata:
  name: psp-volume-types
spec:
  match:
    kinds: [{apiGroups: [""], kinds: ["Pod"]}]
  parameters:
    volumes:
      - "configMap"
      - "emptyDir"
      - "projected"
      - "secret"
      - "downwardAPI"
      - "persistentVolumeClaim"
    # hostPath EXCLUDED — no host mounts

# Apply seccomp RuntimeDefault (blocks 100+ dangerous syscalls)
# Docker:
docker run --security-opt seccomp=/path/to/profile.json myimage

# Kubernetes — apply to all containers via RuntimeDefault:
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
spec:
  securityContext:
    seccompProfile:
      type: RuntimeDefault   # Blocks dangerous syscalls automatically

# AppArmor (Ubuntu/Debian):
docker run --security-opt apparmor=docker-default myimage

# OpenClaw: detect containers running without seccomp profile
openclaw check --namespace production --rule no-seccomp-profile

# Kubernetes: enforce read-only root filesystem
spec:
  containers:
  - name: app
    securityContext:
      readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
    volumeMounts:
    - name: tmp
      mountPath: /tmp         # tmpfs for writable temp
    - name: var-run
      mountPath: /var/run     # tmpfs for runtime files
  volumes:
  - name: tmp
    emptyDir:
      medium: Memory
  - name: var-run
    emptyDir:
      medium: Memory

# Docker:
docker run --read-only --tmpfs /tmp --tmpfs /var/run myimage

# Kubernetes: explicitly prohibit host namespace sharing
spec:
  hostPID: false     # Default false — but set explicitly
  hostIPC: false     # Default false — but set explicitly
  hostNetwork: false # Default false — only enable if actually needed

# OPA Gatekeeper constraint to block hostPID/hostIPC:
apiVersion: constraints.gatekeeper.sh/v1beta1
kind: K8sPSPHostNamespace
metadata:
  name: psp-host-namespace
spec:
  match:
    kinds: [{apiGroups: [""], kinds: ["Pod"]}]
  # Constraint: hostPID and hostIPC must be false